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Abstract Dispositionalist accounts of belief define beliefs in terms of specific sets of
dispositions. In this article, I provide a blind-spot argument against these accounts.
The core idea of the argument is that beliefs having the form [p and it is not
manifestly believed that p] cannot be manifestly believed. This means that one cannot
manifest such beliefs in one’s assertions, conscious thoughts, actions, behaviours, or
any other type of activity. However, if beliefs are sets of dispositions, they must be
manifestable in some way. Therefore, according to my argument, beliefs are not sets
of dispositions. The argument is defended against some possible objections.
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1 The Argument
Dispositionalist accounts of belief define beliefs in terms of specific sets of disposi-
tions. They hold that for someone to believe some proposition p is for that person to
possess one or more particular behavioral dispositions pertaining to p; for example,
dispositions to assert that p in specific situations, to act as if p were true, to
consciously entertain the thought that p when deliberating about whether p, and so
on. Different dispositional accounts are distinguished by the different sets of dispo-
sitions considered relevant for belief ascriptions.1
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1Dispositionalists are, for example, Braithwaite 1932; Ryle 1949; Marcus 1990 and Schwitzgebel 2002.
Here I’m not concerned with any specific kind of dispositionalism. I’m disposed to include under the label
‘dispositionalism’ views like those of Dennett 1987 and Davidson 1984 (commonly defined as
interpretationist) and certain functionalist views like those of Ramsey 1931 and Stalnaker 1984. If sound,
my argument is a problem for all those views which require some sort of manifestability of beliefs (what
hereinafter I call the Manifestability Condition).
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My aim in this article is to give an argument against dispositional accounts of
belief. The argument has a blind-spot structure, like other arguments in philosophical
logic such as Moore’s and Fitch’s paradoxes.2 It proceeds as follows. Take a system
of modal propositional logic (S5). Add to the language two propositional operators, B
and M, standing respectively for ‘it is believed that’ and ‘it is manifestly believed
that’.3 An example of a manifested belief would be a belief manifested by means of a
sincere assertion of what is actually believed. Manifestly believing entails believing
(Mϕ→Bϕ). I assume beliefs and manifested beliefs to hold at least three properties.
First, I assume that both the operators distribute over conjunction. In particular, I
assume distributivity for M:
DistMð ÞM ϕ&ψð Þ→Mϕ&Mψ
If it is manifestly believed that (p and q), then it is manifestly believed that p, and it
is manifestly believed that q.4 Second, I assume the validity of the following
principle:
Ið ÞM⌝Mϕ→⌝Mϕ
If it is manifestly believed that it is not manifestly believed that p, then it is not
manifestly believed that p. An instance of M¬Mϕ is, for example, the belief,
manifested by a sincere assertion, that I do not believe that p.5 By asserting that I
do not believe that p, I manifest my belief that I do not believe that p. Given that
manifested belief entails belief, by modus tollens, if one does not believe that p, then
one also does not manifestly believe that p. So, by asserting that I do not believe that
p, I’m also manifesting my belief that I do not manifestly believe that p.6
The argument is based on two assumptions. A first assumption is a claim on which
all dispositionalists agree, namely:
(MC) every belief is manifestable
Let me call this the Manifestability Condition (MC). The validity of this condition
for dispositionalism stems from the fact that such accounts aim at a definition of
2 On blind-spot arguments, see Sorensen 1988. For the two quoted paradoxes, see Moore 1942, p. 543 and
Fitch 1963.
3 Operators B and M are implicitly indexed to specific subjects and times (read Bp as “subject S at some
time t believes that p”). I assume that operators in the same formula refer to the same subject, as is common
practice in standard doxastic and epistemic logics.
4 Notice that the distributivity of B is not a necessary assumption for my argument. Distributivity of B has
been criticised on the ground that in standard modal logic, it implies single-premise closure (if one believes
that p and that p implies q, then one believes q). This is a pretty strong claim: it seems that one can believe
both that p and that p implies q, but not be able to draw the conclusion that q, simply because one is not
consciously and explicitly considering the two beliefs. I consider distributivity of M much more plausible,
because it seems more intuitive to consider an actually manifested belief (for example a belief manifested
through a sincere assertion) as explicitly and consciously considered.
5 Sincere assertion is a way of manifesting beliefs. In the present article, I assume that it is the paradigmatic
manifestation of belief. On the view that considers sincere assertion as one of the main expressions of belief
there is a large body of literature. A famous example is Williams (1970).
6 (I) is a weaker version of axiom (4) or of axiom (T) in modal logics. The equivalent principle for belief
(B¬Bϕ→¬Bϕ) is commonly accepted in doxastic logic (see, for example, Hintikka 1962 and Linsky 2009).
If it is valid for beliefs in general, it is straightforwardly valid for manifested beliefs. In the second part of
the paper I will answer a possible objection against the validity of such a principle.
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belief in terms of behavioral dispositions (dispositions to assert, judge, act, behave,
and so on), and a necessary feature of dispositions is their possible manifestation
given the realization of specific conditions. Consequently, a thing that is not in any
way manifestable cannot be a disposition, and thus, according to the characterization
of belief given by dispositionalism, would not be a belief at all.7 (MC) can be
formalised as follows:
MCð ÞBϕ→◊Mϕ
If it is believed that ϕ, then it is possible to manifestly believe that ϕ.
A further plausible assumption is that one may believe some proposition p and that
one is not manifesting such a belief in any way (not sincerely asserting it, not consid-
ering it, not acting as if it were true rather than false, and so on).8 In such a case one
would also believe both these propositions in conjunction (p and it’s not manifestly
believed that p). Consider the following example. Jane believes that her car is yellow.
Her belief is not actually manifested in any way. She is actually walking in the street,
thinking of things completely unrelated to the color of her car. At the same time she
believes that she does not manifestly believe her belief that the car is yellow. She
plausibly believes, even if not manifestly, that she is not asserting that her car is yellow,
that she is not acting as if her car were yellow rather than not, that she is not consciously
judging that the car is yellow, and so on.9 Therefore, Jane believes that her car is yellow
and that she does not manifestly believe that her car is yellow. Take a particular
exemplification of a belief having this logical form. In formal language:
B*ð ÞB p&⌝Mpð Þ
It is believed that [p and it is not manifestly believed that p]. The argument
continues as follows:
1) B(p&¬Mp)→◊M(p&¬Mp) by (MC) and (B*)10
7 Notice that this assumption does not amount to the claim that dispositions can be fully analysed in terms
of their manifestability conditions. Rather, it amounts to the more modest claim that dispositions are such
that, at least in some (normal or ideal) conditions, they can be manifested in some way or another. For this
reason, even if the arguments advanced against classical conditional analyses of dispositions – such as, for
example, those of Smith 1977 and Johnston 1992 – were valid, they would not be problematic for
assumption (MC). Such an assumption does not rely on any conditional account of dispositions. Notice
then that so-called finkish dispositions also – dispositions whose conditions for an object's acquiring or
losing disposition D are the same as D's stimulus conditions – are such that they can be manifested in some
possible situation in which interfering conditions are not the case. On finkish dispositions see, for example,
Martin 1994.
8 Some philosophers call non-manifested beliefs ‘tacit beliefs’. Notice that it is an intuitive matter that we
are disposed to ascribe beliefs to people even when they do not manifest them. De facto, it is plausible that,
at a given time, the greater part of our beliefs is not actually manifested in speech acts, or behaviours, or in
any other way. Notice that dispositionalists have a specific reason for accepting the claim that there are tacit
beliefs; one of the motivations for the adoption of a dispositionalist account of belief is precisely the fact
that they can make room for the existence of tacit beliefs, which on different accounts (for example
linguistic accounts) are not considered genuine beliefs or beliefs at all. See, for example, Marcus 1990, pp.
137–143, and Engel 1999, p. 212.
9 In the text above I have listed some of the ways in which dispositionalists traditionally think that beliefs
can be manifested. Notice, however, that my account can be generalized to any type of belief manifestation,
and thus it is potentially effective against more sophisticated dispositionalist accounts of belief.
10 Substituting (B*) for variable ϕ in (MC).
A Blind-Spot Argument Against Dispositionalist Accounts of Belief 73
2) ◊M(p&¬Mp) by (B*) and (1), Modus Ponens
3) ◊(Mp&M¬Mp) by (2) and (DistM)
4) ◊(Mp&¬Mp) by (3) and (I)
Given the two assumptions (MC) and (B*) and the adoption of other plausible
properties of beliefs, it follows that a contradiction is possible. But contradictions are
impossible. Then onemust deny one of the assumptions. Either we deny (B*) and accept
the implausible claim that, for any proposition p, it is necessarily false that it is believed
that p and that the belief that p is not manifested, or we deny (MC), the thesis that every
belief is manifestable. But, according to dispositionalists, (MC) is a fundamental
condition of belief. Denying (MC) entails denying dispositionalism. Whichever of the
two assumptions is denied, there is a problem for dispositionalism.11
Two remarks are in order here. The first one concerns assumption (B*). In my view, a
weaker assumption can work as well as (B*) in deriving the conclusion of the argument.
For the argument being generated it does not seem necessary that one hold a belief
having precisely the form [p and does not manifestly believe that p]. It seems sufficient
that one hold beliefs in propositions having slightly different forms. Consider, for
example, the belief that [p and one is not performing a set of activities A], where
activities A are necessary for manifesting the belief that p. This belief is not
manifestable. In fact, the manifestability conditions of the two conjuncts in the believed
content are jointly incompatible insofar as the manifestation of the second conjunct
entails that the first conjunct is not manifested. For example, assuming (per absurdum)
that the belief that one’s car is yellow can be manifested only by asserting its content,
Jane’s belief that [her car is yellow and she is not asserting anything] would be an
instance of unmanifestable belief; for if she coherently manifests that she is not asserting
anything (for example, bywriting this on a paper, pointing a finger to her closed lips, and
so on), she does not assert anything. Consequently, she cannot manifest the first conjunct
of the belief (which, by assumption, is manifestable only with an assertion).12,13
My second remark is that at least some of the assumptions I made above – in particular
concerning assumption (B*) – rely on potentially controversial ways of approaching
belief ascriptions. For example, even if accepted by several philosophers, the claim that
complex propositions of the form considered above can form the content of a single belief
11 An anonymous referee remarked that there would be an asymmetry between considering beliefs having
the form of (B*) in the first and in the third person, and that a consideration of such cases in the first rather
than the third person would be more in the spirit of blind-spot discussions. I disagree with this point. While
it is true that one of the main blindspot arguments, Moore’s Paradox, relies on first-person belief
ascriptions, the majority of blind-spot arguments do not rely on any specific personal perspective and do
not differ if stated from a first-person or a third-person perspective. This is also the case for the present
argument, which is in many respects very similar to arguments such as Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability.
12 The same point can be made by saying that a stronger version of (I) seems to be valid and could be used
to generate a stronger version of the argument: (I*) (M¬A & (p→A)→¬Mp. Take, for example, the belief,
manifested by some action, that I am not asserting anything. Asserting the particular proposition p implies
asserting something. Then, according to (I*), manifesting my belief that I do not assert anything implies
that I do not manifestly believe that I am asserting p. The validity of (I*) entails that propositions having the
form p & ¬A such that p→A are not manifestly believable. (I*)’s validity seems to be conditional on some
minimal coherency constraints of the subject; more on this point will be said in the reply to the first
objection in the next section.
13 Notice also that the mere possible existence of beliefs of this type is sufficient to pose a problem for
dispositionalism. In fact, that a possible belief is not manifestable would suffice to provide a counterex-
ample to the claim that beliefs are dispositions, thereby invalidating dispositionalism.
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is not uncontroversial, especially if we assume, as some philosophers do, that all beliefs
necessarily can have de dicto manifestations. The truth or falsity of this claim relies on
difficult unsolved questions about what counts as possession and attribution conditions of
belief, on which there may be reasonable disagreement. None of the views about such
issues I am aware of is uncontroversial, nor can any be adequately defended in the
reduced space of a single paper. Therefore, in my argument, I inevitably have to take
some not-uncontroversial positions on these issues. Although I do not pretend to solve all
these deep issues here, I will try to address some potential concerns in the next section,
where I will provide a partial defence of some of my assumptions.
2 Possible Objections and Replies
In this section I consider and address some possible objections to the argument. A first
possible objection is the following: dispositionalists could argue that it is too strong to
argue that the properties attributed to beliefs and manifested beliefs are universally valid.
This is true in particular for principle (I). It has been argued that the principle is valid
only in contexts in which the believer is rational. Thus, in the argument, the step from (3)
to (4) can be reached only if the believer is rational. The contradictory conclusion
follows only if rational constraints are met by the believer. In other words, the conclu-
sion can be turned from the derivation of an inconsistency to the derivation of an
inconsistency in situations of theoretical rationality. However, in my view, this is a
sufficiently bad consequence for dispositionalists. It would amount to the claim that it is
not rationally believable that one can hold beliefs involving the logical form of (B*).
Furthermore, as I said in note 6, many philosophers are disposed to endorse the validity
of principle (I). (I) follows from other very plausible properties of beliefs. In particular,
one can derive (I) from other principles admitted in doxastic logic: from principle
Mϕ→¬B¬Mϕ or from the two following principles Mϕ→BMϕ and Bϕ→¬B¬ϕ.
Other possible objections may be addressed to the assumption that there are beliefs
having the logical form exemplified by (B*), according to which someone believes that
p and that she does not manifestly believe that p. A first possible objection is the
following: a belief can be manifested by means of different types of activities, for
instance, by consciously judging that p, asserting that p, acting as if p, and so on. It
may be that for some of the activities in which we are not engaged, we have tacit beliefs
to the effect that we are not engaged in them; nevertheless – the objection goes – it is
implausible that, for each activity allowing the manifestation of a certain belief in which
one is not at the time engaging, one has a tacit belief to the effect that one is not engaging
in that activity. This assumption would have the consequence of overpopulating the
mind by attributing as many tacit beliefs as would be needed to cover every possible
belief-manifesting activity in which one is not at the time engaged.
I have two possible answers to this objection. First, it is plausible that for some beliefs
there is a limited range of possible manifestations. This is the case, for example, for
beliefs whose conceptual complexity is such that they can bemanifested only by judging
or asserting their content, or for beliefs whose content cannot be expressed with
language, such as beliefs about specific feelings, manifestable only by consciously
considering them with an act of introspection. Now, assume that a belief that p can be
manifested by one single type of activity A. It is plausible that one can believe that she is
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not engaging in the only activity that could manifest the belief that p. Similarly, it is also
plausible that one can believe this proposition in conjunction with p. My second reply to
this objection is that, as argued above, to hold a belief having the logical form of (B*), it
is not necessary that, for each activity manifesting the relevant belief, said activity is
believed not to be performed. Rather, it would be sufficient to hold the generic belief that
p and that no activity manifesting the belief that p is actually being performed.14
The distinction between tacit beliefs and dispositions to believe, first suggested by
Audi (1994), is the basis for a second possible concern one might have regarding the
validity of the assumption that there are beliefs taking the logical form of (B*).15 A tacit
belief is one that is not occurrently believed, but is accessible by a retrieval process that
draws on memory, while a disposition to believe is a mere potentiality of forming a new
belief through belief-formation processes.16 Consider the following example: even if
one answers affirmatively to the question whether she believes that 235 is a larger
number than 59, until one consciously considers the proposition and occurrently
believes it, one does not antecedently believe it. In this case, one has only a disposition
to believe this proposition; this disposition is manifested only when one explicitly
considers whether 235 is larger than 59. The very act of considering this proposition
causes the formation of that belief, which was not antecedently held. On the contrary,
tacit beliefs are antecedently held and recalled to memory when consciously considered.
For example, a tacit belief might be one that is acquired in certain perceptual ways
without thinking of the propositions thereby believed, such as the unconscious belief
that it is raining outside formed by looking out the window without paying attention to
the fact that it is raining.17 When a tacit belief is reflectively considered, one doesn’t
form a new belief, but, rather, simply recalls the pre-existing belief from her memory. On
the basis of this distinction, one could object to my assumption that beliefs having the
logical form of (B*) are not tacit beliefs but only mere dispositions to believe. Such
attitudes would not be beliefs; thus their unmanifestability would not constitute a case
against dispositionalist accounts of belief.18
I am not convinced by Audi’s distinction between tacit beliefs and dispositions to
believe. While I don’t deny Audi’s distinction at a phenomenological level, it is unclear
to me whether instances of what Audi calls ‘dispositions to believe’must be regarded as
14 It is possible that there are a very few or no beliefs having the logical form of (B*). However, I think that
it is reasonable to assume at least that we can hold some tacit beliefs that take this form. Yet, even the mere
possibility of a belief having or entailing this form is sufficiently problematic for dispositionalist accounts
of belief, providing a potential instance of unmanifestable belief. Likewise, notice that, as mentioned in the
first remark at the end of the first section, in order for this argument to be effective, it is not necessary that
one form the belief that she does not manifestly believe that p in particular. It is sufficient to believe that one
is not performing the generic type of activities that allow the manifestation of the belief that p.
15 Audi also refers to tacit beliefs as ‘dispositional beliefs’.
16 See Audi 1994, pp. 419-421.
17 An example of tacit belief offered by Audi is the following: “While absorbed in conversation, one might
come to believe, through hearing a distinctive siren, that an ambulance went by, but without thinking of this
proposition or considering the matter” (ibid., p. 421).
18 Similarly, notice that, given a similar blind-spot argument, a disposition to believe a proposition having
the form [p and it is not manifestly believed that p] would be unmanifestable, and therefore problematic.
One could, however, argue that there are no such dispositions to believe, precisely because such disposi-
tions are dispositions to occurrently believe some proposition, but we cannot occurrently believe proposi-
tions having the considered form. What we would be disposed to believe would be each conjunct in the
conjunction, p and that it is not manifestly believed that p.
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mere potentialities to believe rather than genuine antecedently held beliefs. After all, as
Audi observes, ordinary intuitions about belief attributions confirm that we regard these
as antecedently held beliefs.We are disposed to ascribe to ourselves the belief that 235 is
larger than 59; and to do so not only from the moment in which we consciously realize
its truth, but also at a time preceding any conscious consideration of this proposition as
well.19 A different account, able to preserve both the explanatory advantages of the
distinction and the linguistic intuitions confirming the genuine doxastic nature of so-
called ‘dispositions to believe’ would be preferable.20 However, if what Audi identifies
as mere dispositions to believe are actually beliefs, then according to dispositionalism
such beliefs must also be manifestable, neutralizing the considered objection. In fact,
even if beliefs having the logical form of (B*) were not tacit beliefs in the narrow sense
used by Audi, they would still be beliefs held antecedently to any conscious consider-
ation, and therefore constrained by manifestability conditions. This, in turn, would
engender the blind-spot argument proposed herein.
Nevertheless, even granting the validity of Audi’s distinction, there are grounds for
arguing that beliefs having the logical form of (B*) are tacit beliefs rather than mere
dispositions to believe. This is confirmed by a test used by Audi to distinguish the two
types of attitude: tacit beliefs are beliefs stored in one’s memory and recalled when they
become occurrent; on the contrary, dispositions to believe are dispositions to form
beliefs not yet held in the memory, thus not remembered by the agent forming them.
As Audi observes (Ibid., p. 420), one who is merely disposed to believe a given
proposition cannot be said to remember, or for that matter, to have forgotten the
proposition, or even to have this proposition preserved in his memory. It seems wrong
for one to say that one remembers that 235 is larger than 59 when one considers this
belief for the first time. In contrast, it makes perfect sense to say that one remembers
what is tacitly believed, as when one says that she remembers that yesterday it wasn’t
raining, even if she never thought of this proposition or considered the matter. Similarly,
one may remember that she wasn’t engaging in certain activities required for the
manifestation of a belief. For example, one may recall that yesterday it was raining,
and she didn’t say a word about the fact that it was raining, didn’t act as if it were raining,
19 Intuitively, one believes that 235 is larger than 59 even before she reflectively considers that proposition.
The intuition that one knew that proposition before such a reflective consideration is even stronger. But, if
knowledge entails belief, then one also believed the proposition before any reflective consideration.
20 Audi refers to this possible interpretation as assimilationism (Ibid., p. 430). He describes this view as
distinguishing two ways of dispositionally believing; one which Audi calls “retentional,” taking disposi-
tional beliefs as stored in the memory and available for presuppositions in assertion and action, and the
other “affirmational,” according to which whatever we sincerely tend to affirm when questioned is sincerely
believed. The main reason adduced by Audi against this view is that, if all dispositions to believe are
actually beliefs, they must be stored somewhere in the mind, which would overpopulate our minds with too
many beliefs. In my view, however, the view defended by Audi is affected by the opposite problem, that it
seems to posit far fewer beliefs than what we have, at least according to ordinary belief ascriptions.
Furthermore, the problem of mind overpopulation has been traditionally considered a problem specific to
views assuming a non-modal, spatial existence of beliefs, such as representationalism, according to which
beliefs would be representations registered in a spatially limited memory. An advantage traditionally
attributed to non-representational accounts of belief – such as dispositionalism and pure functionalism –
over representationalism is precisely that the former views can easily account for the actual possession of a
potentially infinite number of beliefs. In fact, at least in principle, there are no limits to the dispositions a
thing may possess, since dispositions are modal properties, mere potentialities of action and behavior which
do not occupy a limited physical space.
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and so on.21 According to the memory test, beliefs which are, at least partially, about the
absence of performance of certain activities – such as those having the form of (B*) –
can be classified as tacit beliefs, and not as mere dispositions to believe.22,23
Another possible concern regarding the assumption that there are beliefs that take the
logical form exemplified by (B*) is that it is not uncontroversial that any set of true claims
can form the content of a single belief. It can be argued that one cannot hold single beliefs
that possess conjunctions as content – in general, or in the specific case of beliefs having
the form of (B*). In this perspective, believing a conjunction would merely consist of
holding two single beliefs in each conjunct. This would be problematic for my argument:
if it were true, the beliefs in each conjunct in (B*) would not be jointly manifestable, yet
they could be individually manifested. Therefore this argument is only effective assum-
ing that it is possible to have single beliefs that have the logical form of (B*).
Assuming that complex propositions (e.g., conjunctions) can be the content of single
beliefs, it seems plausible that any pair of propositions p and q believed singularly, are also
believed in conjunction.24 If Jane believes that it is raining in Paris and believes that it is
21 In order to clarify the nature of beliefs having the logical form of (B*), it is useful to further consider the
analogy between perceptual tacit beliefs and beliefs about the absence of performance of certain activities.
Some philosophers have recently argued that tacit perceptual beliefs do not bear only on the perception of
the presence of things, but also on the perception of their absence. See, for example, Soteriou 2011. So, for
example, one could come to believe that it isn’t raining by perceiving that it isn’t. Such a perceptually-
formed belief seems to be in all respects a tacit belief; in fact, it passes Audi’s tests for tacit beliefs, such as
the memory test and the presupposition availability test (see footnote 23). Away in which one can conceive
of (at least some) beliefs which are about the absence of the performance of some activity, such as those
having the form (B*), is as sorts of perceptual beliefs partially formed on the basis of one’s unconscious
introspective perception of the absence of one’s agential performance. Consider the following example:
yesterday I could have introspectively perceived that I didn’t say that it was raining or acted as if it were,
even if I saw that it was; I could have thereby formed a tacit belief on the matter based on this inner
perception, and now recall this belief from memory.
22 Of course, if a held belief has the logical form of (B*), it cannot pass the memory test, for such belief is
unmanifestable and thus, one cannot remember it. However, beliefs having a similar structure, but such that
the doxastic operators are indexed at a past time (such as the exemplified S’s belief that yesterday it was
raining and S didn’t manifest that belief), may be remembered, and thus may pass the test. Beliefs with the
logical form (B*) are in all respects similar to the exemplified one, except that the second conjunct is not
indexed at a past time, but rather, at every time. On the implicit time index of the doxastic operators in the
argument, see footnote 3.
23 Another test used by Audi for distinguishing between tacit beliefs and dispositions to believe seems to
confirm that beliefs that we are not performing, or have not performed, certain activities, are tacit beliefs.
According to Audi (Ibid., pp. 424-425) what is (tacitly or occurrently) believed is presuppositionally
available in thought and discourse; for example, as a premise for inference or as spontaneously assertible in
talking about topics on which the proposition in question bears. On the contrary, what one is merely
disposed to believe is only indirectly available, say, through considering the proposition or placing it in the
light of one's background beliefs. Now, in ordinary life, we often presuppose in our assertions and actions
beliefs about activities that we didn’t perform. For example, if Mary says something to John with the
intention of informing him about this thing, her assertion presupposes that she didn’t say it to him before –
of course, assuming also that Mary respects the conversational maxim of quantity, requiring one not to be
more informative than necessary. From this it follows that Mary tacitly believed that thing.
24 Notice that, for any p and q, Bp & Bq→B(p & q) is a theorem of standard doxastic logics. One may
object that, if for every couple of beliefs in basic propositions there is a belief in the conjunction of these
propositions, then subjects have an infinite number of beliefs. However, as stated in footnote 20, the
problem of beliefs’ overpopulation of the mind has been traditionally considered a problem specific to
views assuming a non-modal, spatial existence of beliefs, such as representationalism. The potential infinity
of one’s beliefs supports views such as dispositionalism and pure functionalism, which can easily account
for the actual possession of a potentially infinite number of beliefs.
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sunny in London, she also believes that it is raining in Paris and it is sunny in London. The
same is valid for propositions involved in beliefs having the form of (B*): ifMary believes
that it is raining in Paris and believes that she doesn’t manifestly believe that it is raining in
Paris, it is plausible that she also believes that it is raining in Paris and she does not
manifestly believe that it is raining in Paris – i.e., ‘it is raining in Paris and I do not
manifestly believe that it is raining in Paris’ can be the content of a single belief that Mary
has. Therefore, given the assumption that complex propositions can be the content of
single beliefs, I don’t see any principled reason for denying that some of these may be
instantiations of the logical form (B*).25
However, the claim that complex propositions can be the content of single beliefs –
i.e., that beliefs do not have as content only basic propositions – is not uncontroversial. It
can be argued that, in general, beliefs whose content is apparently constituted by complex
propositions are just sets of beliefs about basic propositions. I cannot provide here an
adequate defense that complex propositions can be the content of single beliefs.26 I will
assume this claim here. However, I will briefly suggest some reasons in support of it.
Intuitions about belief attributions show that we are disposed to attribute single beliefs
having conjunctions as content. For example, it is perfectly appropriate to say that Mary’s
belief that Beijing is the capital of China and that its population is over ten million is correct.
Similarly, it is important to note that often the superficial syntactical form of belief
ascriptions does not help to ascertain whether a belief possesses as content a complex
proposition or not. In some cases it is extremely difficult to draw a neat distinction between
basic and complex propositions. This makes any reduction of beliefs whose content is
apparently constituted by complex propositions to beliefs about basic propositions even
more challenging. Consider the following case: Joe believes that he truly believes that Tom
is happy and that today is Saturday. In such a case, it is unclear howmany basic propositions
Joe believes. Some examples of possible answers include: i) one belief whose content is
captured by the sentence following the first “that” clause in the sentence; ii) two beliefs with
content that Joe truly believes that Tom is happy, and that Joe truly believes that today is
Saturday; iii) the two beliefs mentioned in (ii) plus the belief that Joe’s beliefs are true; and
iv) the two beliefs mentioned in (ii) plus the two beliefs that each of them is true.27 Certainly,
25 As said, I don’t see any principled reason for denying such a claim. The dispositionalist may argue that a
reason for denying the existence of beliefs having the form of (B*) is precisely the fact that such beliefs face
the blind-spot problem. However, this move would be completely ad hoc, not based on any independent
principled reason for thinking that there are no such beliefs except the aim to escape a specific objection to
their view. The dispositionalist must provide an independent reason for denying the validity of the principle
Bp & Bq→B(p & q) for these (and only for these) propositions. Otherwise her rejection of this principle
only for propositions that could generate a problem for her view seems blatantly ad hoc.
26 Different accounts of the content of propositional attitudes are available, some compatible with this
claim, while others are not. At one extreme there are views according to which only basic propositions can
be the content of beliefs, and complex beliefs are agglomerates of beliefs about basic propositions. At
another extreme, there is the view according to which we actually hold one unique hyper-complex belief
representing all the states of affairs one takes to be true. In order to defend the claim that single beliefs about
complex propositions are possible, I should criticize a number of accounts incompatible with this claim;
unfortunately, this is a task that cannot be accomplished in this paper.
27 Similar considerations are valid for beliefs generating the blind-spot problem, which do not need to be
explicitly stated in terms of beliefs about conjunctions. Consider the belief that I’m not manifesting my
actually held belief that it is raining. This is apparently not a belief in a conjunction – at least at a superficial
syntactical level. However, as is the case for beliefs explicitly having the form of (B*), this belief is not
coherently manifestable.
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intuitions about belief attributions and the difficulty of drawing a neat distinction between
basic and complex propositions do not provide definitive arguments that complex propo-
sitions can be the content of single beliefs; however, they do provide at least some clue in
support of this claim.28
3 Conclusion
In this article, I provided an argument against dispositional accounts of belief. The
core idea of the argument consists in showing that there are beliefs that cannot be
manifestly believed (i.e., beliefs that cannot be manifested in assertion, conscious
thought, action, behavior, or any other type of activity). The existence of this type of
belief conflicts with a central tenet of dispositionalists, namely that insofar as beliefs
are dispositions, they must be manifestable in some way. I then defended my
argument against some possible objections.
Surely this argument must not be regarded as a definitive refutation of dispositionalist
accounts of beliefs – for one thing because, as pointed out above, it partially relies on
some not uncontroversial assumptions about belief ascriptions and the nature of belief.
Endorsing controversial assumptions seems inevitable, after all, in domains in which
every presupposition has been the object of very deep disputes in the literature.
However, the argument still constitutes a problem, both for philosophers accepting my
assumptions and presuppositions and for those who want to argue for the validity of
doxastic dispositionalism without being forced to take any specific stand on what the
appropriate conditions of belief possession and attribution are. For these philosophers,
the argument can constitute an interesting challenge and can motivate them to provide
not ad-hoc solutions to it. A careful consideration of the threat posed by the argument
could bring dispositionalists to refine their positions, leading to further advancements in
this field of research. In this perspective, the argument can also be seen as a useful
stimulusmotivating further elaborations and developments of dispositionalist theories of
belief, which may eventually help to reorient the future research on the topic.
Acknowledgments I am particularly grateful to Julien Dutant, Pascal Engel, and an anonymous referee
of this journal for extensive discussions of the ideas in this article. I would like to thank the members of the
Episteme research group of the University of Geneva for their helpful comments, and the Swiss National
Science Foundation for financial support.
References
Armstrong, D. M. (1973). Belief, truth, and knowledge. London: Cambridge University Press.
Audi, R. (1994). Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe. Noûs, 28(4), 419–434.
Braithwaite, R. B. (1932). The nature of believing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 33, 129–146.
Davidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon.
Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge: MIT.
28 Another well known problem for the view that beliefs’ contents include only basic propositions is
constituted by beliefs about existential and universal propositions. Propositions of this type are not
reducible to beliefs about basic propositions. See, for example, Armstrong 1973, Ch. 6 and 7.
80 D. Fassio
Engel, P. (1999). Dispositional beliefs, assent, and acceptance. Dialectica, 53, 211–226.
Fitch, F. (1963). A logical analysis of some value concepts. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 28(2), 135–142.
Hintikka, J. (1962). Knowledge and belief: An introduction to the logic of the two notions. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Johnston, M. (1992). How to speak of the colors. Philosophical Studies, 68, 221–263.
Linsky, B. (2009). Logical types in arguments about knowability and belief. In J. Salerno (Ed.), New essays
on the knowability paradox (pp. 163–182). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marcus, R. B. (1990). Some revisionary proposals about belief and believing. Philosophy and Phenome-
nological Research, 50, 132–153.
Martin, C. B. (1994). Dispositions and conditionals. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44, 1–8.
Moore, G. E. (1942). In P. A. Schlipp (Ed.), A reply to my critics. The philosophy of G. E. Moore. Evanston:
Northwestern University.
Ramsey, F. P. (1931). The foundations of mathematics, and other logical essays. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. New York: Barnes & Noble.
Schwitzgebel, E. (2002). A phenomenal, dispositional account of belief. Nous, 36, 249–275.
Smith, A. D. (1977). Dispositional properties. Mind, 86, 439–445.
Sorensen, R. A. (1988). Blindspots. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Soteriou, M. (2011). The perception of absence, space, and time. In J. Roessler, H. Lerman, & N. Eilan
(Eds.), Perception, causation, and objectivity. Consciousness and self-consiousness. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Stalnaker, R. (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge: MIT.
Williams, B. (1970). Deciding to believe. In H. E. Kiefer & M. K. Munitz (Eds.), Language, belief, and
metaphysics (pp. 95–111). Albany: SUNY Press. Reprinted in Williams, B. (1973). Problems of the
Self. London: Cambridge University Press, pp. 136-151.
A Blind-Spot Argument Against Dispositionalist Accounts of Belief 81
